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The Incorrect Usage of Propositional Logic in Game Theory
1 INTRODUCTION
During the last decades, game theory has encountered a great success while becoming the major analysis
tool for studying conflicts and cooperation among rational decision makers. We observed fine and ground-
breaking works based on solid and rigorous mathematical propositions and thinking. However, recently,
we discovered that more and more articles have been published in peer-reviewed journals with severe fal-
lacies. Especially, we had to learn that the indirect proof, which is based on a material implication, was
not applied correctly. A material implication is a rule of replacement that allows to replace a conditional
statement by a disjunction. These authors confuse and mix up non-equivalent fundamental statements
from propositional logic to come up with a desired contradiction without asking if the derived conclusion
makes sense from a logical point of view.
A statement if A ⇒ B and its contrapositive if ¬B ⇒ ¬A are logically equivalent statements, which
are also equivalent to the disjunction¬A∨B. The common proof technique based on a material implication
replaces the conditional statement if A ⇒ B by the disjunction ¬A ∨ B. It should be evident that the
conjunction A ∧ ¬B is the negation of the disjunction ¬A ∨ B, and that it is not its contrapositive. For
instance, to prove the implication if A ⇒ B, we can focus on the opposite ¬(A ⇒ B) ≡ ¬(¬A ∨ B) ≡
(A ∧ ¬B) in order to get from if A ⇒ B the logical equivalent implication if A ∧ ¬B ⇒ B ∧ ¬B. This
imposes a proof by contradiction, since B ∧ ¬B is a falsum ⊥. However, if the starting point is a proof
by contraposition, i.e., ¬B ⇒ ¬A, we obtain the following equivalent statement A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A. It
should be evident that this also imposes a proof by contradiction.
In accordance with (A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) ≡ (A ⇒ B), one has to be careful concerning the logical
conclusions when combining a proof by contradiction with a material implication. To get a valid proposi-
tion, one has to assume thatA∧¬B is an invalid premise (¬A∨B valid) from which a false statement like
A∧¬A can be deduced. Then, we know that the implication A∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A is a valid statement, and
from this result, we can infer that the original statement A⇒ B is also a truth. However, a wrong propo-
sition is obtained while assuming first A ∧ ¬B to be a true premise (¬A ∨ B invalid), and then deriving
the falsehood A ∧ ¬A. Here, one derives from a true premise something what is false. This statement is
obviously a falsehood. As a consequence, one can infer that A⇒ B is invalid, i.e., A 6⇒ B.
In contrast, it is not a permissible conduct to derive from a valid premise A ∧ ¬B a so-called con-
tradiction, say ¬A, to deduce that A ∧ ¬B is false, and from this outcome, one follows that the negation
of A ∧ ¬B, i.e., the disjunction ¬A ∨ B must be valid, and therefore A ⇒ B must follow too. This is
a fallacy. Actually, one has established that something true implies something which is false. This is an
incorrect implication. Doing so, disproves the result.
Similar, it is a fallacy to assume that A ⇒ B is false, i.e., A ∧ ¬B holds in order to derive a con-
tradiction, say A ∧ ¬A, to finally deduce from this contradiction that A ∧ ¬B is false, and that one has
therefore proved A ⇒ B by the logical equivalence of A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A and A ⇒ B. Again, one has
disproved oneself, since one gets that A∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A is a falsehood confirming that A⇒ B is false as
well. Obviously, this kind of arguing is a circular reasoning (circulus in probando). Unfortunately, this is
exactly the line of argument that we have observed in our sample from the literature. These authors have
shown in their proofs the exact opposite of what had been intended to prove.
To summarize, the authors try to establish that a proposition φ “satisfies” a falsum ⊥ to conclude that
¬φ holds, i.e., (φ ` ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ. This constitutes a formal expression of an indirect proof. However, it
should be evident that this is not the same as (φ ⇒ ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ. Since in the former case we know that a
proposition φ “satisfies”⊥ whereas in the latter case a proposition φ “implies”⊥. Moreover, in the former
case it is not a priori known that the proposition φ satisfies a falsum, it is also possible to derive something
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true, which is a posteriori a tautology, since then (φ ` >) holds, and we have not obtained a contradiction
w.r.t. our premise. Thus, one starts with a proposition φ that is assumed to be true to establish if something
inconsistent or consistent occurs w.r.t. our premise to finally conclude that the premise φ is wrong or true.
In contrast, for the latter case we know a priori, say due to A ∧ ¬A = ⊥, that the proposition φ implies
a falsum ⊥, which also holds a posteriori. We get a wrong statement, since we know that (φ ⇒ ⊥) is
an invalid statement if φ is assumed to be true. Notice that the statement (φ ⇒ ⊥) cannot be true. This
follows from the assumption that φ is true, which implies that ¬φ must be false violating the equivalence
of (φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ, consistency of the equivalence would require that ¬φ must be true, this cannot happen
when φ is set to true. We deduce (φ⇒ ⊥) is a false statement if φ is assumed to be true. Note, the degree
of freedom for (φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ is one and not two as it is imposed by the authors. The premise φ implies
a falsum but not a contradiction of our premise φ. By equivalence, the false statement ¬φ determines that
(φ ⇒ ⊥) must be false too. Therefore the premise φ is true and not false as required. Thus, we do not
observe a contradiction w.r.t. φ, but we observe a contradiction w.r.t. a valid statement of (φ ⇒ ⊥) if the
premise φ is set to true. We realize that these authors have incorrectly applied (φ ⇒ ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ. If we
would follow the authors, we could always deduce that φ must be false, because a falsum occurs always.
This means that we always get the desired result, and we could prove perverted results (see, for instance,
Example 3.2). Of course, this is a fallacy.
The presented literature reflects only our research interest and should not be misunderstood as a rep-
resentative survey. Moreover, we have chosen this sample according to the fact that these papers are
irreversible flawed. Nevertheless, we guess that the described deficiencies are broader propagated as we
might imagine. It is indispensable that the published results reflect a certain kind of reliability, otherwise
we will observe in the literature contradictory results like Theorem A and Theorem ¬A are true, i.e.,
(A ∧ ¬A) = >.
The present paper is organized as follows: In the forthcoming section we introduce some notation
and definitions applied in the discussed articles in order to make the presentation of the material more
self-contained. Section 3 discuss a first case from the field of the axiomatization of solution concepts.
We quote the results and the essential parts of the authors argumentation followed by some reports of the
committed logical mistakes. Whereas Section 4 provides some further cases which are originated from the
field of cooperative oligopoly games. We close our presentation with some final remarks in Section 5.
2 SOME PRELIMINARIES
In the sequel, we apply in essence the notation of the article Kleppe et al. (2013). For doing so, we let
U be a set, the universe of players, containing, without loss of generality, 1, . . . , k whenever |U | ≥ k.
Here |U | denotes the cardinality of U . A coalition is a finite nonempty subset of U . Let F denote the
set of coalitions. A cooperative transferable utility game (TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉 such that N ∈ F
and v : 2N → R with v(∅) := 0. The real number v(S) ∈ R is called the value or worth of a coalition
S ∈ 2N . Let S be a coalition, the number of members in S will be denoted by s := |S|. Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU
game. We call N its grand coalition and denote the set of all proper nonempty sub-coalitions of N by FN ,
i.e. FN = 2N\{∅, N}. Define respectively the set of feasible payoffs, the set of Pareto optimal feasible
payoffs (pre-imputations), and the set of individually rational pre-imputations (imputations) of 〈N, v〉 by
X∗(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) ≤ v(N)},
X(N, v) := {x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N)},
I(N, v) := {x ∈ X(N, v) |xi ≥ v({i}) ∀i ∈ N}.
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where we apply x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk for every S ∈ 2N , if x ∈ RN , with x(∅) := 0. For S ⊂ N and
x ∈ RN , xS denotes the restriction of x to S, i.e., xS := (xk)k∈S . Moreover, we identify a cooperative
game by the vector v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ ΓN = R2|N| . In addition, we denote by ΓI the set of games 〈N, v〉
with I(N, v) 6= ∅, that is, 〈N, v〉 ∈ ΓI iff v(N) ≥
∑
k v({k}).
A solution σ assigns a subset σ(N, v) of X∗(N, v) to any game 〈N, v〉. Its restriction to a set Γ of
games is again denoted by σ. A solution on Γ is the restriction to Γ of a solution.
Given a vector x ∈ X(N, v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x
in the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S,x) := v(S)− x(S). (2.1)
Take a game v ∈ ΓN . For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over
player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ X(N, v) is given by the maximum excess at x over the
set of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.2)
The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ X(N, v) that balances the maximum surpluses for each distinct pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel of the game v, and is defined by
PrK(N, v) := {x ∈ X(N, v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} . (2.3)
Related to the pre-kernel solution is the kernel of a n-person game, which is the set of imputations
x ∈ I(N, v) satisfying for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
[sij(x, v)− sji(x, v)] · [xj − v({j})] ≤ 0 and (2.4)
[sji(x, v)− sij(x, v)] · [xi − v({i})] ≤ 0. (2.5)
In order to define the pre-nucleolus of a game v ∈ ΓN , take any x ∈ RN to define a 2N -tuple vector
θ(x) whose components are the excesses ev(S,x) of the 2N coalitions S ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing
order, that is,
θi(x) := e
v(Si,x) ≥ ev(Sj ,x) =: θj(x) if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 2N . (2.6)
Ordering the so-called complaint or dissatisfaction vectors θ(x) for all x ∈ RN by the lexicographic order
≤L on RN , we shall write
θ(x) <L θ(y) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 2N , (2.7)
such that θi(x) = θi(y) for 1 ≤ i < k and θk(x) < θk(y). Furthermore, we write θ(x) ≤L θ(y) if either
θ(x) <L θ(y) or θ(x) = θ(y). Now the pre-nucleolus PrN(N, v) over the pre-imputations set X(N, v)
is defined by
PrN(N, v) = {x ∈ X(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ X(N, v)} . (2.8)
The pre-nucleolus of any game v ∈ ΓN is non-empty as well as unique, and it is denoted as ν(N, v).
Moreover, it is a sub-solution of the pre-kernel. In addition, notice that if the core of a game 〈N, v 〉
defined by
C(N, v) := {x ∈ X(N, v) | ev(S,x) ≤ 0 ∀S ⊆ N}
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is non-empty, then the pre-nucleolus belongs to the core whenever the core is non-empty, that is, ν(N, v) ∈
C(N, v).
Now the nucleolus N(N, v) of a game v ∈ ΓN over the set I(N, v) is defined as
N(N, v) := {x ∈ I(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ I(N, v)} . (2.9)
The set N(N, v) is a singleton whose unique element is referred to as νI(N, v). Similar to the pre-
nucleolus, the nucleolus is a sub-solution of the kernel whenever the imputation set is non-empty. More-
over, if C(N, v) 6= ∅, then νI(N, v) ∈ C(N, v)
Let us introduce the definition of a weighted (pre)-nucleolus. A weight system is a system p :=
(pN )N∈F such that for every N ∈ F, pN := (pNS )S∈FN , the weight system for N , satisfies pNS > 0 for all
S ∈ FN . Let p be a weight system and 〈N, v〉 a TU game. The weighted pre-nucleolus PrNp(N, v) and
the weighted nucleolus Np(N, v) of 〈N, v〉 according to p are defined by
PrNp(N, v) := PrN((pNS e
v(S, ·))S∈FN , X(N, v)),
Np(N, v) := N((pNS e
v(S, ·))S∈FN , I(N, v)).
Notice that also the set of the weighted pre-nucleolus PrNp(N, v) is a single point so that this unique
element is referred to as νp(N, v). Similar, for the set Np(N, v) which is a singleton and whose unique
element is denoted as νpI (N, v).
Let p a weight system, 〈N, v〉 be a game, x ∈ RN , and i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. The maximum p-weighted
surplus of k over l at x w.r.t. 〈N, v〉 is defined by
spij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
pNS e
v(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}.
The weighted pre-kernel PrKp(N, v) and weighted kernel Kp(N, v) respectively, relative to the
weight system p of a TU game 〈N, v〉 are defined by
PrKp(N, v) :=
{
x ∈ X(N, v) | spij(x, v) = spji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
,
Kp(N, v) :=
{
x ∈ I(N, v) | spij(x, v) ≥ spji(x, v) or xi = v({i}) ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
.
Notice, that the weighted pre-nucleolus is a non-empty as well as unique solution which is a sub-solution
of the weighted pre-kernel. Again, if the imputation set is non-empty, then the weighted nucleolus belongs
to its weighted kernel. Moreover, if C(N, v) 6= ∅, then νp(N, v) ∈ C(N, v).
An objection of player i against a player j w.r.t. a payoff vector x ∈ RN in game v ∈ ΓN is a pair
(yS , S) with S ∈ Gij and yS := {yk}k∈S satisfying the following properties:
v(S) =
∑
k∈S
yk and yk > xk for k ∈ S. (2.10)
A counter-objection to the objection (yS , S) is a pair (zT , T ) with T ∈ Gji and zT := {zk}k∈T satisfying
v(T ) =
∑
k∈T
zk and zk ≥ xk for k ∈ T\S
zk ≥ yk for k ∈ T ∩ S.
(2.11)
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Thus, if the pair (yS , S) is an objection against vector x, then any member of coalition S ∈ Gij can
improve upon rather than accepting proposal x. Acceptance would mean that players in S ∈ Gij would
accept a loss due to ev(S,x) > 0. Hence, a player i can formulate an objection against player j using
coalition S ∈ Gij w.r.t. the proposal x iff the excess ev(S,x) is positive.
In contrast, a counter-objection (zT , T ) of player j against player i w.r.t. objection (yS , S) uses a
coalition T without player i, i.e. T ∈ Gji, to formulate a proposal that cannot strictly be improved upon to
the precedent proposal for players belonging to the set S ∩ T and which can also not strictly be improved
upon w.r.t. x for all k ∈ T\S. This means, that player j can only use a coalition T ∈ Gji with non-negative
excess ev(T,x) to formulate a counter-objection against player i.
An imputation x ∈ I(N, v) is an element of the bargaining set M(N, v) of game v ∈ ΓN whenever
for any objection of a player against another player w.r.t. x in v ∈ ΓN exists a counter-objection. The
bargaining set can be empty whenever the imputation set is empty. For zero-normalized games the impu-
tation set is never empty, and therefore the bargaining set M(N, v) exists, which contains the nucleolus
and kernel of the game, i.e. νI(N, v) ⊆ K(N, v) ⊆M(N, v).
Let σ be a solution on a set Γ of games. A solution σ may satisfy some of the following possible
properties:
Non-Emptiness (NE): If σ(N, v) 6= ∅ for all 〈N, v〉 ∈ Γ.
Single-Valuedness (SIVA): If |σ(N, v) | = 1 for every 〈N, v 〉 ∈ Γ.
Pareto-Optimality (PO): If σ(N, v) ∈ X(N, v) for all 〈N, v〉 ∈ Γ.
Anonymity (AN): If for 〈N, v 〉 ∈ Γ, for an injection pi : N → U and for 〈pi(N), piv 〉 ∈ Γ implying
σ(pi(N), piv) = pi(σ(N, v)).
Symmetry (SYM): If σ(N, v) = pi(σ(N, v)) for all 〈N, v〉 ∈ Γ and all symmetries pi of 〈N, v〉.
Individual Rationality (IR): If 〈N, v 〉 ∈ Γ and ~x ∈ σ(N, v), then xk ≥ v({k}) for all k ∈ N .
Equal Treatment Property (ETP): If 〈N, v 〉 ∈ Γ, ~x ∈ σ(N, v) and if k and l are substitutes, i.e.,
v(S ∪ {k}) = v(S ∪ {l}) for all S ⊆ N\{k, l}, then xk = xl.
Covariance with Strategic Equivalence (COV): If for 〈N, v1 〉, 〈N, v2 〉 ∈ Γ, with v2 = t · v1 + m for
some t ∈ R++,m ∈ R2N , then σ(N, v2) = t · σ(N, v1) + m, whereas m ∈ RN and m is the
vector of measures obtained from m.
3 THE CASE OF THE INDIRECT PROOF
We quote now some statements from Kleppe et al. (2013) and discuss their proofs in order to observe how
deficient these authors have applied the indirect proof. The essential arguments and conclusions of the
authors are set in italic and are highlighted by a red coloring.
Theorem 3.3 (Kleppe et al. (2013, p. 7)): Let p be a weight system, Γ ⊇ ΓI , and σ be one
of the following solutions on Γ: Np,PrNp,Kp or PrKp. Then σ satisfies ETP if
and only if p is symmetric.
Proof. The “if-part” is an obvious consequence of the definitions of the considered weighted
solutions. In order to show the “only-if-part” let σ be one of the considered solutions and let
it satisfy ETP. Assume, on the contrary, that p does not satisfy the desired property. Hence,
there exists a coalition N and some S, S′ ∈ FN with |S| = |S′| such that pNS 6= pNS′ . It
remains to show that σ violates ETP. As S′ arises from S by a sequence of replacements of
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one player by one other player, we may assume that |S\S′| = 1. Let T, k, l be determined
by S = T ∪ {k} and S′ = T ∪ {l}. Let 〈N, v〉 be the game defined by v(N) = v(T ) =
v(N\T ) = 0, v(T ∪ {i}) = −1 for all i ∈ N\T , and v(R) = −p
N
S −pNS′
min{pNQ |Q∈FN}
for all
other R ∈ FN . Then 〈N, v〉 ∈ ΓI . Let y = νp(N, v). By Remark 2.4(1), y ∈ σ(N, v).
As σ satisfies ETP and as all players inside T are substitutes and all players in N\T are
substitutes as well, there exist α, β ∈ R such that yi = α for all i ∈ T and yj = β for
all j ∈ N\T . As y(N) = v(N) = 0, |T |α + |N\T |β = 0. Let x = 0 ∈ RN . Then
ev(T,x) = ev(N\T,x) = 0 and ev(R,x) < 0 for all R ∈ FN\{T,N\T}. By the definition
of the weighted pre-nucleolus, ev(T,y) = ev(N\T,y) = 0. Hence, y(T ) = y(N\T ) = 0
implying |T |α = β = 0, i.e., y = x. For any R ∈ FN\{S} with k ∈ R 63 l, the definition of
v gives
pNR e
v(R,y) ≤ pNR
−pNS − pNS′
pNR
< −pNS = pNS ev(S,y).
A similar argument is valid when switching the roles of k and l, so spkl(y, v) = −pNS 6=
−pNS′ = splk(y, v). Hence, y /∈ PrKp(N, v),y /∈ Kp(N, v) and the desired contradiction is
obtained by Remark 2.4(1). (Kleppe et al. (2013, pp. 7-8))
We give now the reasons why Theorem 3.3 cannot be correct. For this purpose, we introduce two truth
tables. A logical statement/proposition is formed by the symbols A or B, which means that a statement
A is true or false. However, the inversion is formed by the negation of a proposition by using the logical
term “not” denoted by ¬. If A is a proposition, then ¬A is the negation of A verbalized as “not A” or “A
is false”. The effect of negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication on the truth values of logical
statements is summarized by a so-called truth table. In this table, the capital letter T indicates a true
proposition and F indicates that it is false.
A B ¬B A⇒ B ¬(A⇒ B) A⇐ B A⇔ B A ∨ ¬B A ∧B A ∨B
F F T T F T T T F F
F T F T F F F F F T
T F T F T T F T F T
T T F T F T T T T T
A B ¬A ¬B ¬A⇒ ¬B A ∨ ¬B ¬A⇐ ¬B ¬A ∨B A ∧ ¬B ¬A⇔ ¬B
F F T T T T T T F T
F T T F F F T T F F
T F F T T T F F T F
T T F F T T T T F T
Two statements are indicated as logically equivalent through the symbol≡. For instance, by the truth table
we realize that the two statements ¬A ⇐ ¬B and ¬A ∨ B are logically equivalent, which is formally
expressed by (¬A ⇐ ¬B) ≡ (¬A ∨ B). A falsum ⊥ is, for instance, the conjunction A ∧ ¬A whereas
a tautology > can be expressed, for instance, by the disjunction ¬A ∨ A. Moreover, a proposition or
premiseAmight satisfy a falsum or a tautology or an arbitrary propertyB, which is expressed by (A ` ⊥)
or (A ` >) or (A ` B) respectively. This should not be confounded with an implication of the form
(A⇒ ⊥) or (A⇒ >) or (A⇒ B) respectively.
To show that a proposition A and its negation ¬A cannot both be true, some uses the representation
of a conditional statement like ¬A ⇒ A to conclude that ¬A and A cannot both be true, and that a
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contradiction occurs with the consequence that the initial assumption must be wrong and A must be true.
But this is fallacy, which confounds ¬A ⇒ A with ¬A ` A. First of all, ¬A ⇒ A simply says that if
¬A is false then A must be true, and if ¬A is true, then A has to be false. On this statement is nothing
contradictory. Moreover, we do not have ¬A∧A as we can observe by the following chain of equivalences
(¬A⇒ A) ≡ (¬(¬A) ∨A) ≡ (A ∨A) ≡ A.
Hence, ¬A⇒ A is equivalent toA, but not to ¬A∧A. In contrast, a representation of an indirect proof by
¬A ` A indicates that the initial assumption made by ¬A is false, since ¬A satisfies A. Here one deduces
that ¬A cannot hold, the initial assumption is wrong and A holds. But this is not an implication, this is
a deduction. This reveals that deduction and implication are not synonymous expressions. Even though
we have (¬A ` A) ⇔ A, the valency of the prerequisite ¬A or A doesn’t matter (one-dimensional), i.e.,
whether it is true or false, whereas in a conditional statement it does (multi-dimensional).
After this short refresher of propositional logic, we now resume our argumentation to demonstrate
that the above Theorem 3.3 is not correct. To this end, we restate this Theorem in a more concise form.
There, Kleppe et al. claim that σ (weighted (pre-)nucleolus/(pre-)kernel) satisfies:
ETP (A is true) if, and only if, the weight system p is symmetric (B is true).
The contrapositive of the Theorem states that σ fulfills
not ETP (¬A) if, and only if, the weight system p is asymmetric (¬B).
Kleppe et al. discuss the “only if part”, i.e., if σ satisfies ETP (A is true), then the weight system p is
symmetric (B is true). They apply their indirect proof with elements of a material implication. A material
implication is a rule of replacement that allows to replace a conditional proposition by a disjunction. For
instance, the conditional statement A implies B can be replaced by the disjunction ¬A ∨ B, which is
logically equivalent to the former proposition (see the truth table). In contrast, an indirect proof is based
on the fact that either a logical statement is true or false but not both. This proof technique is also known
under the name “reductio ad absurdum”, i.e., one leads an “argumentum ad absurdum” or to a “reduction to
absurdity”. This is a common form of argument seeking to demonstrate that a statement is true by showing
that a false, untenable, or absurd result follows from its denial, or in turn to demonstrate that a proposition
is false by showing that a false, untenable, or absurd result follows from its acceptance. Formally, a proof
by contradiction tries to establish (φ ` ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ, this should not be confounded with (φ ⇒ ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ.
Doing so, can provoke severe fallacy, this will be more thoroughly discussed in sequel.
In this case, Kleppe et al. want to prove that whenever A is true, then B is also valid, which is
equivalent to if ¬B then ¬A. Moreover, from the above truth table we observe that if ¬B, then ¬A is
equivalent to ¬A ∨ B, but not to A ∧ ¬B. By the truth table, it should be evident that the conjunction
A ∧ ¬B is the negation of the disjunction ¬A ∨ B, and it is not its contrapositive. Obviously, A ∧ ¬B
is logically equivalent to ¬(A ⇒ B), which is not equivalent to ¬B ⇒ ¬A. If A ⇒ B then we can
focus on the negation ¬(A ⇒ B) ≡ ¬(¬A ∨ B) ≡ (A ∧ ¬B), since A ⇒ B is logically equivalent
to A ∧ ¬B ⇒ B ∧ ¬B, which imposes a proof by contradiction. Similar, if we have the contrapositive
¬B ⇒ ¬A, we can prove this by an indirect proof through if A∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A. This allows one to infer
that A⇒ B is valid or invalid.
For their proof of Theorem of 3.3, they try to run an indirect proof while relying on a material impli-
cation.1 For doing so, they assume that A and ¬B is fulfilled in order to get a contradiction, because the
1It is inconceivable for us that the considered articles are based on a circular reasoning (circulus in probando), for this reason
we focus in the sequel on the indirect proof based on a material implication. Obviously, there is only a slight change in the
argumentation necessary to incorporate in our discussion the circular argument from the introduction. This means that the
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conjunction A ∧ ¬B is the negation of the disjunction ¬A ∨ B. If they have obtained their contradiction,
they assume that the proposition ¬A ∨ B is true, to finally infer that the implication A ⇒ B is true as
well. But this is not a permissible implementation, since one cannot suppose first that A ∧ ¬B is given to
conclude that ¬A ∨ B is valid or invalid, that is based on the preceding truth or falsehood of a statement.
By an indirect proof, the conjunctionA∧¬B implies something false, that is, one introduces a prerequisite
A ∧ ¬B that is assumed to be true, and yields the implication to a falsehood, for instance, that A ∧ ¬A is
invalid. Then, we know that the implicationA∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A is a wrong proposition. As a consequence,
the implication A⇒ B is invalid as well, due to (A∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A) ≡ (A⇒ B). However, if A∧¬B
is assumed to be false, then A ∧ ¬A is invalid too. The proposition is a valid outcome, the implication
A⇒ B is valid as well. This, and only this, is the correct line of argument.
Example 3.1. Let us look at a statement A like “he is a game theorist” and ¬B “he has not mastered
propositional logic”. Furthermore, consider three propositions:
Implication A⇒ B: if “he is a game theorist”, then “he has mastered propositional logic”.
Contrapositive ¬B ⇒ ¬A: if “he has not mastered propositional logic”, then “he is not a game theorist”.
Disjunction ¬A ∨B: “he is not a game theorist” or “he has mastered propositional logic”.
If the outcome of some logical inference is “he is a game theorist” and “he has not mastered propositional
logic”, that is, A ∧ ¬B is valid, then all three statements are false. However, if A ∧ ¬B is invalid, then all
statements are true. This can be accomplished by applying an indirect proof. Thus, we do not assume for
the latter case that “he is a game theorist” and “he has not mastered propositional logic” (A∧¬B is invalid)
to derive some false statement like “he is a game theorist” and “he is not a game theorist” (A ∧ ¬A), this
means, that the whole proposition is a truth, we infer from this outcome that all three statements must be
satisfied. However, if it is given that “he is a game theorist” and “he has not mastered propositional logic”
(A ∧ ¬B is valid), and we get the false proposition “he is a game theorist” and “he is not a game theorist”
(A ∧ ¬A), we infer that this invalids the implication. Therefore, all three statements are wrong.
By an indirect proof, Kleppe et al. have to establish that whenever it is false that the solution σ
satisfies the conjunction ETP (A is valid) and p is asymmetric (¬B), then ETP (A) and non ETP (¬A)
are a falsehood on σ. Hence, the proposition if σ satisfies ETP (A is true), then the weight system p is
symmetric (B is true) is a truth, since a false statement implies something false. This means that for an
indirect proof, one starts with a claim that is assumed to be false and leads this claim to a contradiction.
Then, one can infer that the proposition, that should be proved, is a truth.
In contrast, they start with let σ “satisfy ETP”, i.e., A is true, and then supposing in the next step
that p is asymmetric (¬B), in order to construct a game from which they try to derive a contradiction.
This means, they assume that σ satisfies ETP and the weight system p is asymmetric, from which they
want to show that a contradiction can be drawn, that is, something false follows. However, by the above
consideration, it should be evident this is mystified, and is therefore a fallacy. Nevertheless, we have
to observe by their proof that this prerequisite will be used in the sequel by their phrase “as σ satisfies
ETP” to finally derive that y /∈ PrKp(N, v),y /∈ Kp(N, v) follow, which is their “desired contradiction”
that σ does not satisfy ETP (¬A). In effect, they have disproved their Theorem 3.3, because they have
shown that a true prerequisite implies a wrong claim, however, this implication is a wrong statement. As
a consequence, we conclude that the implication A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A is wrong, and in accordance with
(A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) ≡ (A ⇒ B), we get that A ⇒ B must be false either. Hence, the proposition if σ
satisfies ETP (A is true), then the weight system p is symmetric (B is true) is a falsehood. They disproved
considered case imposes no loss of generality on our line of argument, which implies that in both cases the authors disprove
themselves.
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themselves, since the authors have shown the exact opposite of what had been intended. We infer from
that, Theorem 3.3 is false.
To see that from a false conclusion a false implication follows, can be observed from an example taken
from an elementary course in mathematics.
Example 3.2. Let m denote an arbitrary integer, and let us “prove” the wrong implication that
if m2 is even (A), then m is odd (B),
while running a purported proof. In a first step, we assume that A ∧ ¬B is valid. For this purpose, we
suppose that m is even (¬B) s.t. m = 2 k for some integer k, and assume that m2 is even too (A is true),
i.e., m2 = 2 (k2 + k) for some integer k2 + k. Note that k2 + k is an integer, if k is an integer. Thus,
m2 = 2 (k2 + k) is even. Then we get that m2 = (2 k)2 = 4 k2 = 2 (k2 + k), and the roots are k = 0
and k = 1. Therefore, we get m = 0 as well as m = 2, or m2 = 0 and m2 = 4 respectively. All of
them are even integers. However, the relation only holds for k = 0 and k = 1, hence the field for m
is {0, 2} and not Z, which is the desired contradiction. We conclude that m is odd (B). Hence, a valid
premise A ∧ ¬B implies something wrong (B ∧ ¬B). In the literature, it is a commonly held believe that
this is a true proposition. Assuming this, one would conclude that A ∧ ¬B is wrong, then the negation of
this expression, i.e., ¬A ∨ B is true. From which some would deduce that A ⇒ B is a valid statement.
This is certainly a fallacy, one incorrectly applied (φ ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ. However, it should be obvious by the
discussion from the introduction that this gives in fact a disproof of A⇒ B, thus we have A 6⇒ B.
By the consideration from above, we realize that Kleppe et al. have shown that a valid premiseA∧¬B
implies a falsehood, which is a wrong statement. Remember that the implications A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A or
A∧¬B ⇒ B ∧¬B are logically equivalent to A⇒ B. Hence, if one has shown that such an implication
or every other implication that should be equivalent to A ⇒ B produces a wrong proposition, one has to
conclude that A⇒ B must be invalid too. In this case, on cannot deduce that A ∧ ¬B is false, this is due
that A ∧ ¬B was assumed to be valid. Applying then that A ∧ ¬B is false in order to infer from this, that
its negation A ∨ ¬B as well as the implication A⇒ B must be valid, is, of course, a fallacy.
Now, we shall give some arguments of how the proof must run to get the desired logical proposition.
This will also demonstrate that Theorem 3.3 cannot be saved, and therefore the whole article is false.
Kleppe et al. have to show that the weighted pre-nucleolus y = νp(N, v) is unequal to the null-vector.
By the construction of the game, the players k and l are substitutes, from that y 6= 0 must follow. Then,
they have to show that yk 6= yl such that yk = −β and yl = β is given. Such a result can be now deduced
from the constructed game, since ETP is not anymore assumed (see also Example 3.4). Hence, ETP is
false (¬A). This would have been the final step by a proof by contraposition, i.e., ¬B ⇒ ¬A. From
Example 3.6 below, that gives an unintended counter-example by the authors, we can even learn that such
a result cannot be guaranteed.
In the next step, we observe by following the arguments of Kleppe et al. for their proof of Proposition
3.5 that they repeat this fallacy. They are again confused between the propositional statements of a proof
by contradiction and the material implication. We do not want to bother the readership while representing
their whole lengthy proof of Proposition 3.5, we, therefore, confine ourselves on the main faulty arguments
applied by the authors.
Proposition 3.5 (Kleppe et al. (2013, p. 8)): If p is a symmetric weight system, then for any
game 〈N, v〉, PrKp(N, v) is compact.
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, that PrKp(N, v) is not compact. Let S = (Skl)k,l∈N×N,k 6=l
be a constellation such that XS is unbounded. Let (xr)r∈N be an unbounded sequence
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of elements of XS . Then, after replacing (. . . ) Since p is symmetric, pNR e
v(R,xr) >
pN
Slk
ev(Slk,xr) = pN
Skl
ev(Skl,xr) = µr for r taken sufficiently large, so the desired contra-
diction has been obtained. (Kleppe et al. (2013, p. 8))
The authors have to show by the proposition that
if the weight system p is symmetric (A is true), then for any game, PrKp(N, v) is compact (B is true).
For a proof by contraposition, they have to establish that the equivalent argument
if for any game, PrKp(N, v) is not compact (¬B), then the weight system p is asymmetric (¬A),
holds true.
The authors start by the assumption that PrKp(N, v) is not compact (¬B), and select a sequence
which is unbounded to derive a contradiction. Then again, they assume that p is symmetric (A is true)
to get a so-called desired contradiction. To summarize, they introduce a valid premise A ∧ ¬B to obtain
a contradiction. By the same reasoning as above, this argument is misguided. One cannot conclude,
whenever something is true from which a false implication follows, that this a true proposition. Again, they
have to show that wheneverA∧¬B is invalid, a wrong claim will be obtained, i.e., a contradiction follows
in order to infer that the conclusion A⇒ B can be drawn. Once more, Kleppe et al. have disproved their
own Proposition 3.5. We conclude their proposition is wrong as well. A further component of invalidating
their results.
Next, let us consider the unintended counter-example of Kleppe et al. to Theorem 3.3.
Example 3.6 (Kleppe et al. (2013, p. 9)): Let N = {1, . . . , 5} and pN be defined by
pNS = 7 if |S ∩ {1, 2, 3}| = 2 and |S ∩ {4, 5}| = 1 and pNS = 1 otherwise,
for all S ∈ FN . Then xt = (−2t,−2t,−2t, 3t, 3t) ∈ PrKp(N,0) for all t ≥ 0.
Indeed, the maximal p-weighted excess at xt is attained by the coalition S with
pNS = 7, and it is 7t. However, the set of these coalitions is completely separating,
i.e., for any k, l ∈ N, k 6= l, there exists a coalition S ∈ FN with pNS = 7 and
l /∈ S 3 k so that spkl(xt, v) = 7t. Hence, this weighted pre-kernel is unbounded.
Example 3.6 demonstrates for an asymmetric weight system p, and for v = 0, that the derived weighted
pre-kernel is not compact. The example is correct related to the proposition of the weighted pre-kernel.
However, in contrast to their proof for Theorem 3.3, we have spkl(x
t, v) = 7t > pNS = p
N
S′ = 3t whenever
t > 0 for S = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S′ = {1, 2, 3, 5}. By the above discussion, it should, however, be evident
that even Proposition 3.5 is false due to the fact that Kleppe et al. make the same wrong conclusion as
in their proof of Theorem 3.3. Moreover, they apply in their example an ambiguous argument. They
introduce an asymmetric weight system and obtain after some manipulation the result that the weighted
per-kernel is not a compact solution set. Thus, they have discussed an example where the introduced
weight system p is asymmetric (¬A), and as a consequence, the derived weighted pre-kernel solution is
non-compact (¬B). Reading the statement of their Proposition 3.5, we realize, however, that they must
demonstrate by their example the reverse statement that whenever the weighted pre-kernel is non-compact
(¬B), then the weight system p must be asymmetric (¬A). Both propositions are logically not equivalent.
Thus, we can again conclude that the observed non-compactness is not obtained by the asymmetric weight
system p. It makes even not so much sense to us. Nevertheless, we have v = 0, all players are substitutes.
Note that the weighted pre-kernel contains the weighted pre-nucleolus, which is here the null-vector2.
2Confirmed from Peter Sudho¨lter by private conversation.
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But, if the weight system p is asymmetric, the weighted pre-nucleolus cannot be given by the null-vector
due to Theorem 3.3. On the contrary, the weighted pre-nucleolus distributes the null-vector, and satisfies
therefore ETP, invalidating Theorem 3.3, and as a consequence their results. We observe that this example
confirms the disproof of Theorem 3.3 by Kleppe et al..
We discuss now another counter-example where the weighted pre-kernel coincides with the weighted
pre-nucleolus while distributing the null-vector.
Example 3.3. Let pN be defined as by Example 3.6 from Kleppe et al. (2013), hence the weight system
p is asymmetric. Define next the TU game as in their proof of Theorem 3.3 from Kleppe et al. (2013),
that is, the game is defined by v(N) = v(T ) = v(N\T ) = 0, v(T ∪ {i}) = −1 for all i ∈ N\T , and
v(R) =
−pNS −pNS′
min{pNQ |Q∈FN}
for all other R ∈ FN . Here, coalition T is given by {1, 2, 3}, and the complement
of coalition T by {4, 5}. Choose k = 4 6= l = 5, coalition S is determined by T ∪ {k} and S′ by T ∪ {l}.
Then, we obtain an asymmetric TU game given by
v(N) = v({1, 2, 3}) = v({4, 5}) = 0, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = −1, v(R) = −2,
for all other R ∈ FN . Recall that the weight system p is asymmetric, whereas the unique weighted
pre-kernel coincides with the weighted pre-nucleolus, which is the null-vector. This result violates the
outcome of their proof of Theorem 3.3 that νp(N, v) 6= 0 should hold. Again, the weight system p is
asymmetric, and the weighted pre-nucleolus as well as the weighted pre-kernel satisfy ETP. Here, players
{1, 2, 3} and {4, 5} are substitutes. Contradicting the fact that according to Theorem 3.3 of Kleppe et al.
(2013) the weighted pre-kernel should not satisfy ETP. We discussed a further example for their disproof
of Theorem 3.3.
The next example demonstrates that wrong conclusions are drawn for their proof of Theorem 3.3
by Kleppe et al., when we impose ETP as an assumption rather than a result from logical deduction.
Example 3.4. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and pN be defined by
pNS = 3 if |S ∩ {1, 3}| = 2 and |S ∩ {2, 4}| = 1 and pNS = 1 otherwise,
for all S ∈ FN . Hence, the weight system p is asymmetric. Define next the TU game as in their proof of
Theorem 3.3 from Kleppe et al. (2013). Let T = {1, 2}, k = 3, l = 4, then the complement of coalition
T is determined by {3, 4}. Moreover, coalition S is given by T ∪ {k} = {1, 2, 3} and coalition S′ by
T ∪ {l} = {1, 2, 4}. Then, we obtain an asymmetric TU game that is quantified by
v(N) = v({1, 2}) = v({3, 4}) = 0, v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = −1, v(R) = −4,
for all other R ∈ FN . In this game, players {1, 2} are substitutes as well as the players {3, 4}. The
weight system p is asymmetric, and the the weighted pre-nucleolus as well as the weighted pre-kernel
are given by νp(N, v) = {0, 0,−1, 1}/2 and do not satisfy ETP. Let y = νp(N, v). Even though, we
have ev(T,y) = ev(N\T,y) = 0, and y(T ) = y(N\T ) = 0, we do not get that y = 0 is drawn.
Thus, from the solution νp(N, v) = {0, 0,−1, 1}/2, we realize that we cannot impose ETP to conclude
that from y(T ) = y(N\T ) = 0 the solution vector y must be the null-vector. Imposing ETP as an
assumption rather than a result from logical inference yields to a wrong conclusion. Furthermore, we
derive −3 = −pNS < spkl(y, v) = −3/2 = splk(y, v) < −pNS′ = −1, contradicting what Kleppe et al.
claim to show in their Theorem 3.3. Nevertheless, a further confirmation of their disproof.
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4 MORE MISGUIDED LOGIC FROM THE LITERATURE
Unfortunately, the case discussed in the previous section is not the sole example of a mystified logic. A
second case is the article of Watanabe and Muto (2008). These authors try to study stable profit sharing
in a patent licensing game while investigating licensing agreements in a bargaining set with a coalition
structure. They employ, in almost all of their proofs by contradiction, the same line of logical wrong
arguments as before. Similar, as in the preceding section, these authors also disprove their own results
while being confused about propositional logic. As a consequence, at least Proposition 1, 2, 3, and 5
of Watanabe and Muto (2008) are invalid, and devalue their results. However, before we can go into the
details, we have to introduce some additional notations and definitions from their article.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of identical firms producing a homogeneous good. An external licensor
called player 0 has a patent of a cost-reducing or quality improving technology. The set of players is
{0} ∪ N . Each non-empty subset of {0} ∪ N is a coalition. The game has three stages. At stage (i),
the licensor selects a subset S ⊆ N of firms to invite them in exclusive negotiation to acquire some
licenses. In stage (ii) they negotiate about the payment made to the licensor. According to Watanabe and
Muto, this specifies at stage (iii) a TU game with coalition structure denoted by ({0}∪N, v, PS), whereas
PS = {{0} ∪ S} ∪ {{i} | i ∈ N\S}. They assume, in addition, that whenever s firms hold a license, then
W (s) denotes the competitive equilibrium gross profit of a licensee, and L(s) the corresponding gross
profit of a non-licensee. They require also that the following relations
W (s) > L(0) ∀s = 1, . . . , n, L(0) > L(s) ∀s = 1, . . . , n− 1,
hold. From this, a characteristic function v : 2{0}∪N 7→ R is defined through
v({0}) = v(∅) = 0, v({0} ∪ T ) = tW (T ), v(T ) = t L(ρ(t)), ∀∅ 6= T ⊆ N,
whereas L(ρ(s)) := minr=|R|,R⊆N\S L(r).
Watanabe and Muto define the set of imputations for all permissible coalition structures PS as
XS :=
{
x = {x0, x1, . . . , xn} ∈ Rn+1
x0 +∑
i∈S
xi = sW (s),
x0 ≥ 0, xi ≥ L(ρ(1)) ∀i ∈ S, xj = L(s) ∀j ∈ N\S
}
.
They define, in addition, the core of a game with a coalition structure PS as a subset of XS which is
given by
CS =
{
x ∈ XS |x(T ) ≥ v(T ) ∀T ⊆ {0} ∪N, T ∩ ({0} ∪ S) 6= ∅
}
.
The bargaining set w.r.t. a coalition structure PS is defined by
MS =
{
x ∈ XS | no player in {0} ∪ S has a valid objection at x
}
.
Then the following symmetric solutions are defined by
C˜S = CS ∩ X˜S , M˜S = MS ∩ X˜S ,
where X˜S = {x ∈ XS |xi = xj = x˜ ∀i, j ∈ S}.
The argumentation of Watanabe and Muto is best observed by Proposition 1. There, those authors
argue by an indirect argument that if A ∧ ¬B is valid, then B follows, hence, a contradiction is drawn
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to infer that A ⇒ B must be given. Similar as above, these authors conclude from a wrong implication
A∧¬B ⇒ B∧¬B that the logical equivalent statementA⇒ B is satisfied. Nevertheless, both statements
are false, disproving their Proposition 1. Once more, the crucial arguments are set in italic and highlighted
in red.
Proposition 1 (Watanabe and Muto (2008, p. 512)): CS = ∅ if S 6= N .
Proof. We first show that C˜S = ∅ if S 6= N . Suppose C˜S 6= ∅. Take x ∈ C˜S with xi = x˜
for any i ∈ S. If x˜ ≤ L(0),∑i∈N xi = s x˜ + (n − s)L(s) < nL(0) = v(N) because
L(0) > L(s) = xj for any j ∈ N\S. Hence, x˜ > L(0). Next take a coalition {0} ∪ T such
that |T | = |S|, T ⊆ N\S if |S| ≤ n/2 and T ⊇ N\S if |S| > n/2. Let t = |T |. Then
x0 +
∑
i∈T xi < sW (s) = tW (t), because x0 + s x˜ = sW (s) and x˜ > L(0) > L(s). This
contradicts x ∈ C˜S . Finally, C˜S = ∅ implies CS = ∅ by Lemma 1. (Watanabe and Muto
(2008, p. 512))
Watanabe and Muto try to show that
if S 6= N (A is true), then CS = ∅ (B is true).
The contrapositive of this statement is given by
if CS 6= ∅ (B is false), then S = N (A is false).
They start by assuming that C˜S 6= ∅, hence CS 6= ∅ (¬B) is satisfied. In the next step, they construct a
vector from C˜S . For doing so, they attain that S 6= N is given (A is true) due to the construction of S, to
finally conclude that x /∈ C˜S , from which CS = ∅ (B) is attained by those authors. The authors want to
employ an indirect proof while drawing from a valid assumption to a contraction. But, we observe again
that they have actually shown that from a truth A ∧ ¬B one derives B. But this means that they deduce
from the wrong implication A ∧ ¬B ⇒ B ∧ ¬B that the implication “if S 6= N , then CS = ∅” (A⇒ B)
is given, this is a fallacy due to (A ∧ ¬B ⇒ B ∧ ¬B) ≡ (A ⇒ B). They have incorrectly applied
(φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ. In fact, they have established that A⇒ B is an invalid implication, disproving their own
proposition. Similar as by Kleppe et al., they also being confused by propositional statements.
By investigating the proof of Lemma 2 from Watanabe and Muto (2008, p. 514), we also have to realize
that this kind argumentation was not an isolated event. Glancing through the whole article, we observe that
those authors have applied this fallacy several times, since almost all of their results are false. By studying
their arguments for proving the Lemma 2, we find the same wrong usage of the indirect proof as for their
proof of Proposition 1. Instead of assuming that A ∧ ¬B is invalid to deduce that a contradiction follows
in order to get that (¬A ∨ B) ≡ (A ⇒ B) is valid, they argue that a truth A ∧ ¬B implies a falsehood
¬A, from which they infer that A⇒ B follows.
Lemma 2 (Watanabe and Muto (2008, p. 514)): For any S ⊆ N , if x ∈ M˜S then x0 ≤
s∗ (W (s∗)− L(0)).
Proof. Let x ∈ M˜S . Suppose x0 > s∗ (W (s∗) − L(0)). By the definition of s∗, x˜ =
(sW (s)− x0)/s < (sW (s)− s∗ (W (s∗)− L(0)))/s ≤ L(0). Take an objection (y, N) of
i ∈ S against the licensor in x with yk = L(0) for any k ∈ N . If the licensor had a counter
objection (z, {0} ∪ T ) to the objection with z0 ≥ x0 > s∗ (W (s∗) − L(0)) and zk ≥ yk =
L(0) for any k ∈ T , it should be z0 +
∑
k∈T zk > s
∗ (W (s∗)−L(0)) + t L(0) ≥ tW (t) by
the definition of s∗, where t = |T |. Hence, no counter objection can be made, contradicting
that x ∈ M˜s. (Watanabe and Muto (2008, p. 514))
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Again, Watanabe and Muto try to apply an indirect proof based on a material implication to the statement
if x ∈ M˜S (A is true), then x0 ≤ s∗ (W (s∗)− L(0)) (B is true),
which is equivalent to the contrapositive
if x0 > s∗ (W (s∗)− L(0)) (¬B), then x 6∈ M˜S (¬A).
In their proof, the authors have slightly changed their line of argument while supposing first that x ∈ M˜S
(A is true), and by the next step that x0 > s∗ (W (s∗) − L(0)) (¬B) is satisfied, to finally conclude that
x 6∈ M˜S (¬A) must follow. By the same reasoning as above, this argumentation is logically false, since
they have shown the wrong implication A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A. Again, Watanabe and Muto have disproved
their own Lemma 2, as a consequence, the statement “if x ∈ M˜S (A), then x0 ≤ s∗ (W (s∗)−L(0)) (B)”
does not hold.
Proposition 3 of Watanabe and Muto (2008) is false, since Lemmata 2, 4, and 5 are not correct, and
therefore Proposition 5 is false either. The reader will observe while inspecting these purported proofs in
more detail that those authors have again disproved themselves with the consequence that this devalues the
whole article.
We close this section while mentioning a third case where an author deduces wrong conclusions from
logical statements derived from an indirect proof which relies on a material implication. We only summa-
rize the main arguments by the author without going into the details, and without discussing the notation
as well as the definitions.
In the article of Lardon (2012), the author claims to provide for the class of oligopoly TU games an
existence result of the γ-core and a single-valued allocation rule inside of the γ-core that is called by the
author Nash Pro rata-value. Moreover, Lardon (2012) asserts to present an axiomatic characterization of
the NP-value. However, even this article is false due to the fact that the author confuses and mixes up non-
equivalent fundamental statements from propositional logic in applying false indirect arguments. Lardon
neither recognizes the logical relationship (A∧¬B ⇒ A∧¬A) ≡ (A⇒ B) nor (¬A∧B ⇒ ¬A∧A) ≡
(B ⇒ A).
His proof of the “sufficiency case” of Proposition 3.1 is not correct. Similar as in the other examples,
he uses elements from a material implication for establishing the logical equivalent proposition ifA thenB.
This author starts withA∧¬B to perform this kind of proof to get a contradiction in order to conclude that
the implicationA⇒ B is drawn. Once more, this author does not recognize that whenever a valid premise
A∧¬B implies something false like ¬A, one cannot get a true statement. In this case, the implication must
be falsehood. Similar to the other cases, this author applies the prerequisite A of the positive statement
and ¬B in order to prove the contrapositive statement if ¬B ⇒ ¬A. First, he assumes that the payoff
vector xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form oligopoly game ΓP = (P, (XS , piS)S∈P), that
is, premise A holds, and then assuming in the next step that the strategy profile xˆ = (xˆS)S∈P ∈ XN is
not a Nash equilibrium of the normal form oligopoly game Γ = (N, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) under P, i.e., premise
B is false. Premise A is then used in his proof to construct in a first step the vector xˆ, and finally to
construct the contradiction that xˆP ∈ XP is not a Nash equilibrium (¬A). In effect, he has shown that
A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A is a wrong proposition. As a consequence, the implication A⇒ B must be false too,
in accordance with (A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) ≡ (A⇒ B). The author incorrectly applied (φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ.
For completeness, we just want to mention that the same misguided line of argument is also given
for the “necessity case”. There, he is not aware about the following logical equivalence (¬A ∧ B ⇒
¬A∧A) ≡ (B ⇒ A). No wonder that he shows that the truth ¬A∧B implies a falsehood ¬A∧A, which
is as well a wrong implication. It follows that B ⇒ A must be invalid. In summary, he has shown in both
cases the exact opposite of what he had claimed to prove. As a consequence, Lardon has disproved his
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own Proposition 3.1.
In the sequel, we show what will happen if we apply a proof by contraposition ¬B ⇒ ¬A for the
“sufficiency case” in order to see where we run into problems. But then the starting point of the proof
has to be the assumption that the payoff vector xˆ ∈ XN is not a Nash equilibrium of the normal form
oligopoly game Γ = (N, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) under P (¬B), which implies by imposing the correct assumption
like quasi-concavity on the profit function pii in order to guarantee existence of an equilibrium that∑
i∈S
pii(xˆS , xˆ−S) ≤
∑
i∈S
pii(xˇS , xˆ−S),
is true. In this case, Formula (11) of Lardon (2012, p. 394) implies for payoff vector xˆ ∈ XN that only∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi) ≥ CS(xˆS).
can be estimated, since it cannot be supposed that xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, it is
also not anymore clear that
piS(xˆ
P) < piS(xˇ
S , xˆ−S),
is satisfied as it was claimed by Lardon (2012, p. 395). This inequality can only be obtained when the
author can establish by some logical inference that xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form
oligopoly game ΓP = (P, (XS , piS)S∈P) (A is valid), but not by an assumption. Moreover, Corollary
3.2 is not correct either, implying in connection with the disproof of Proposition 3.1 that the TU game in
γ-characteristic function form is not well-defined. Again, the results of the article are devalued according
to these logical flaws.
Example 4.1. To see that a TU-game in γ-characteristic function form without transferable technologies
might not be well-defined, we introduce a Cournot oligopoly situation 〈N, (zk)k∈N , (ck)k∈N , p〉 with five
firms N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} producing a homogeneous good and having production capacities given by the
capacity vector {z1, z2, z3, z4, z5} = {2.4, 0.15, 2, 15, 20}. The individual marginal costs of the firms
are given by the cost vector {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} = {1/8, 5/2, 5, 1/24, 1}. Thus, the cost functions are
increasing in its arguments. Furthermore, we assume that the parameters of the concave inverse demand
function p(X) = a− b ·X2 are given by {a, b} = {120, 1} with joint production of X = ∑i∈N xi. Then
the profit function is specified for each firm i by pii(X) := p(X) · xi − ci · xi. Notice, that the inverse
function p(X) is strictly decreasing and concave in its arguments within the relevant domain, and falls
therefore in the realm of Lardon’s assumptions.
To observe that no Nash-equilibrium can be guaranteed, we consider the coalition structure P =
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}}. The implicit best response function of coalition/trust {1, 2, 3} is given by
B{1,2,3}(X¯) =

1
16
(
5773
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 2.4]
1
16
(
5545
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ (2.4, 2.55]
1
16
(
5305
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ (2.55, 4.55],
with X¯ =
∑
i∈{1,2,3} xi. Similar, the individual best replies of outsider firms 4 and 5 are quantified
through
B4(X¯) =
3
5735
(
1927
8
√
X¯2 + 955.833− 89849
125
X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 15]
B5(X¯) =
3
5735
(
28208
119
√
X¯2 + 955.833− 85080
119
X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 20].
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That we cannot guarantee a Nash-equilibrium in the game model as discussed by Lardon (2012) is due
that the system of equations derived by the first-order condition is not independent, and therefore underde-
termined, i.e., the system has fewer independent equations than variables. Such a system has no solution.
This can be observed by the above system of best reply functions as well as by Figure 1. The individual
best replies of firms of trust {1, 2, 3} are shifted by constants downward, they are not independent. To
guarantee in this case an equilibrium it is enough to assume that the most efficient firm 1 of trust {1, 2, 3}
has a sufficient large capacity. Thus, we can assure an intersection of the best reply function of coali-
tion {1, 2, 3} with that of outsider firms 4 and 5 (cf. Figure 1). But then there is no need to focus on
oligopoly TU-games without transferable technologies. Hence to assure an equilibrium, we have either
to consider a game model with transferable technologies, i.e., all firms of a trust can rely on the most
efficient production technology, or we have to introduce a substitution rate among the goods violating the
homogeneous good assumption. While incorporating a substitution rate under such a game model without
synergy effects among the firms allows us to guarantee a Nash-equilibrium, however, the γ-core might be
empty. Though Lardon tries to overcome the problematic of a non-existing equilibrium while incorporat-
ing capacity constraints, and making the strategy set compact. Of course, this is not enough to assure an
equilibrium as we can observe next.
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Figure 1: Individual Best Reply Functions
However, if we choose the above capacity levels, then the best reply of trust {1, 2, 3} becomes discon-
tinuous on the relevant domain with the consequence that we do not observe anymore an intersection of
best reply functions (cf. Figure 2). There is no intersection of best replies, therefore no Nash-equilibrium
can exist. Hence, no γ-characteristic value of coalition {1, 2, 3} can be determined, the associated γ-
characteristic function is void. This establishes that the game model is not correctly specified, because of
the logical flawed Proposition 3.1.
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Figure 2: Best Reply Functions of Trust {1, 2, 3} and Outsiders
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have demonstrated on a small sample from the game theory literature, how fatal it can be for the relia-
bility of the derived results, when authors have not imposed a simple and quick logical cross-check on their
argumentation. We focused on the indirect proof based on a material implication to report some logical
failures committed in the literature, and how we have to proceed in order to get logical correct proposi-
tions. Even though ostensible, the derived results seem to be sound and rigorous, they are, nevertheless,
wrong, since they have violated fundamental statements from propositional logic. In fact, we observed that
these authors have disproved themselves, invalidating the results and articles (see also Meinhardt (2016)).
REFERENCES
J. Kleppe, J. H. Reijnierse, and P. Sudho¨lter. Axiomatizations of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions. Annals of Operations
Research, pages 1–17, 2013. ISSN 0254-5330. doi: 10.1007/s10479-013-1494-1. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.
1007/s10479-013-1494-1.
A. Lardon. The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints. Theory and Decision, 72(3):387–411, 2012.
ISSN 0040-5833. doi: 10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5.
H. I. Meinhardt. Finding the nucleoli of large cooperative games: A disproof with counter-example. CoRR, abs/1603.00226,
2016. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.00226.
N. Watanabe and S. Muto. Stable Profit Sharing in a Patent Licensing Game: General Bargainng Outcomes. International Journal
of Game Theory, 37(4):505–523, 2008. ISSN 0020-7276. doi: 10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9. URL http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9.
17
